Showing posts with label General Stanley McChrystal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label General Stanley McChrystal. Show all posts

Thursday, May 16, 2013

Gen. Stanley McChrystal writes about " The Courage to Change "

As a student of Leadership and a HR Professional, I have spoken to many about " change " and why it is so difficult for people.

WE are creatures of habit....each one of us has our daily routines and we use these to set our schedules on a daily basis. By doing so, we can control our life and try to have an expectation of what to expect.  I try to help others understand that "change" is the one true constant in life. 

Here, General Stanley McChrystal talks about how he had to come to grips with change to make sure his efforts and the efforts of his troops were effective.

This is part one of his posting and I will follow-up with part two when it is published.

The Courage to Change

By General Stanley McChrystal


At 49 years old, I was a two-star general, and less than a year into what would ultimately be an almost five-year tour as the Commanding General of the Joint Special Operations Command. Within two years I would be wearing a third star, and would ultimately spend almost the entire command tour forward deployed in combat zones. My position placed me in charge of thousands of the United States’ most elite service-members, men and women who had been screened and tested at multiple levels throughout their careers to make it into the military’s most demanding units. I commanded Army Rangers and special operators; the most highly-selected Navy SEALs; the best helicopter pilots in the world; the Air Force’s finest medics and communicator;, and a host of brilliant specialists whose diverse expertise was required to keep our organization moving. We were thousands strong, dispersed around the globe, and by any measurable standard the best trained and most rigorously selected organization that the battlefield had ever seen. My force comprised people selected (amongst other qualities) for their inability to accept anything but victory: We were hard-wired to win.

All of this made my revelation that spring all the more difficult. We were losing. There were no front lines to measure, no enemy higher-headquarters to spy on. This type of conflict was new to us. My units were nightly engaging Al Qaeda in Iraq’s fighters, but our enemy’s influence continued to spread. We were pushing ourselves to our physical and mental edge, but the enemy network was expanding faster than we could move. Most importantly, every metric I could think of was trending negative: al Qaeda acts of violence were on the rise, shadow governments were surpassing the influence of local authorities, civilian casualties were steadily rising, car bombs were exploding every day in Baghdad. Meanwhile, my organization simply had no more capacity, human or technical. Like most soldiers, I’d never contemplated finding myself on the losing side in a war, but I was increasingly convinced that this was what if felt like.

The word—losing—pounded in my head as the hot desert air whipped through the helicopter. I had felt it in my gut for several months, and my visit that night had confirmed it for me intellectually.

But the challenge was this. Our people weren’t losing: They won all their fights. Our units weren’t losing: They could point to their progress. Every element of my several-thousand-strong task force was effectively and steadily winning when it came to their area and their problem set. Yet, collectively, we were still losing. The challenge we faced, I was beginning to realize, was unlike anything we’d ever encountered—or, worse, anticipated—as a possibility.

The members of our force in Anbar were risking their lives every night to address the problem they faced. But did we have the right solution? More important, did we understand the real problem? It was hard for anyone in our force to truly articulate how their actions, effective as they were, tied to the larger effort across the battlefield to debilitate Al Qaeda’s insurgency. At best, I sensed, we were winning in small pockets—capturing enemy leaders and weapons—and hoping that this somehow supported an overarching strategy. At worst, we were risking, losing, and taking lives without knowing that those sacrifices were getting us any closer to ending the war.

At that point, on that night, I had more questions than answers. But I’d begun to understand what needed to be done. As the leader of this organization, I knew the first step would be significant, and it was one that only I could take. We needed to fundamentally change our organization, and that change would need to start with me. I knew, too, that I was entering what would be one of the most challenging periods of my career. I did so with a message that I and I alone could deliver to the Task Force. It went something like this:
You are the finest force the world has ever known, and I’m proud of everything you’re doing. You go out, night after night, into harm’s way—and do incredible things. As individual units, you're winning every time. I recognize and appreciate that. But I’m here to tell you we are losing this war. I know each of you is doing everything you can, and doing it better than history has ever seen. I also know that your families at home make sacrifices every day to support you, our mission, and our nation. I recognize and appreciate that.

So we need to make a choice. We can continue on this road, and all go home with medals and war stories, but those stories will all end with the fact that we, collectively, lost the war. Or, we can change how we operate. If we don’t, we will lose—of that I have no doubt. Changing will be a painful process, but the road we're on is destined for failure. So we start now. I will be here with you, every step of the way.

Thus began our journey

Friday, May 4, 2012

A Lesson from retired General Stanley McChrystal on Design, Teamwork and Leadership

I came across an issue of  Fast Company Magazine back when I was traveling for business and was intrigued with some of the best business writing I had ever seen.  These guys were writing on aspects of business that Forbes and others missed.  They changed the game of what business analysis/writing was and it made things better.


The enclosed video is from their website and features retired General Stanley McChrystal who led the Joint Special Operations Command.  He laid the groundwork for all the tactics we use in Iraq/Afghanistan and was instrumental in the War on Terror.  He got sacked because of the Rolling Stone article that gave a rather unflattering view of POTUS and how McChrystal felt about the administration.


The enclosed is a great mini-leadership lesson.  I would follow General McChrystal into battle as he is the real deal.  Obama is not and the difference in who is a real leader and who is not is plain to see for anyone.  Guys like McChrystal earned everything he has because he worked hard and sacrificed.  That is why his leadership lessons are the best you can get.  The Vactioner-In-Chief, not at all.  Take a listen, it is well worth your time.

Friday, October 7, 2011

General Stanley McChrystal's POV - The US began the war with a "frighteningly simplistic" view of Afghanistan

General Stanley McChrystal tells it like he sees it. His POV is that we are only 50% of the way to achieving what is needed for Afghanistan. We are at the 10 year mark and there is little support for additional troops or resources as there are more dire needs at home.

This is not where anyone would expect to be at 10 years into a conflict. I agree with the General but know that while he states " The US began the war with a "frighteningly simplistic" view of Afghanistan...", the solution will not be simple or easy.

The task of finalizing our involvement in Afghanistan will fall on the next President, as our present one will only be able to stand pat with what we are doing presently. Obama has benefited politically from the very military he criticized for most of his adult life. If it was up to him, we would have cut & run long ago. His concern was always with his political life, not what is best for the country or the world.

An excerpt from Bob Woodward's book " O'Bama's Wars " paints the picture of what the President's real concerns were:

The President lost his poise, according to the book. “I’m done doing this!” he erupted.

To ensure that the Pentagon did not reinterpret his decision, Mr. Obama dictated a six-page, single-space “terms sheet” explicitly laying out his troop order and its objectives, a document included in the book’s appendix.

Mr. Obama’s struggle with the decision comes through in a conversation with Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, who asked if his deadline to begin withdrawal in July 2011 was firm. “I have to say that,” Mr. Obama replied. “I can’t let this be a war without end, and I can’t lose the whole Democratic Party.”

And there you have it. Not the loss of life, National Security or the fate of civilians...." I can’t lose the whole Democratic Party.”

No wonder we are only 50% of the way to achieving our goal.....Politics came first for the President, as it does in all things.

Stanley McChrystal said the US and Nato were only 50% of the way to achieving their goals in Afghanistan. UK Telegraph - 10/07/11

One of America's most celebrated generals has issued a harsh indictment of his country's campaign in Afghanistan on the 10th anniversary of the invasion to topple the Taliban.

The US began the war with a "frighteningly simplistic" view of Afghanistan, the retired general Stanley McChrystal said, and even now the military lacks sufficient local knowledge to bring the conflict to an end.

The US and Nato are only "50% of the way" towards achieving their goals in Afghanistan, he told the Council on Foreign Relations.

"We didn't know enough and we still don't know enough. Most of us, me included, had a very superficial understanding of the situation and history, and we had a frighteningly simplistic view of recent history, the last 50 years."

McChrystal led the Obama administration's "surge" strategy that started in 2009 and sent US troop levels in Afghanistan to more than 100,000. Widely acknowledged as a gifted military commander, he was forced to resign last year amid controversy over remarks he made to Rolling Stone magazine.

The 10th anniversary of the war, marked on Friday, has prompted sober reflection in the US about a conflict that has passed Vietnam as the military's longest war.

Just over 2,750 foreign troops have been killed – 28% of them in Helmand – while between 14,000 and 18,000 civilians have died as a result of fighting, according to various estimates.

Yet although the US entered Afghanistan to hunt down Osama bin Laden and topple the Taliban, its most prominent targets quickly slipped across the border into Pakistan.

The al-Qaida leader was discovered in Abbottabad, north of Islamabad, last May, while the Taliban have used remote border bases in Pakistan's tribal areas to launched a stiff resurgence.

In his comments on Thursday night, McChrystal also indirectly criticised the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003, saying it made success in Afghanistan more difficult to achieve. The invasion "changed the Muslim world's view of America's effort", he said.

"When we went after the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, there was a certain understanding that we had the ability and the right to defend ourselves and the fact that al-Qaida had been harboured by the Taliban was legitimate. I think when we made the decision to go into Iraq that was less legitimate [in the eyes of the Muslim world]."

The 10th anniversary has also been marked in downbeat fashion in Afghanistan where talk of US-driven "nation building" has largely evaporated. Despite $57bn in international aid since 2001, aid agencies say most people remain mired in deep poverty.

"There has been some important progress, especially in urban areas," said Anne Garella of Acbar, an umbrella group of 111 foreign and local aid agencies. "But our research highlights the gap behind positive rhetoric and grim reality."

An Acbar study found that 80% of Afghans now have access to health services compared with 9% in 2001. The number of children in school has rocketed from barely one million a decade ago, 5,000 of them girls, to seven million today, one third of whom are girls.

But Afghanistan still has been some of the world's worst health indicators due to shoddy facilities, conflict and official corruption.

Afghans have grown highly sceptical of western aid over the years, with a widespread perception – partly well founded – that much of the money finds its way back to western countries through security costs and inflated expatriate wages.

But the greatest worry for most Afghans now is the consequence of the US drawdown planned for the end of 2014, which will see the vast majority of 150,000 foreign troops leave the country.

The American plan is to hand power to the shaky Karzai-led government, which is plagued by corruption and enjoys diminishing credibility. McChrystal said that building a legitimate government that ordinary Afghans believed in, and which could serve as a counterweight to the Taliban, was among the greatest challenges facing US forces.

Efforts are under way to bolster the government's authority. Nato says it will have trained 325,000 Afghan soldiers by January 2015, and the US is likely to continue financial support, although exact levels have yet to be decided.

But rising ethnic and political tensions could destabilise the country before then. And plans to bring the Taliban to peace talks were hit by the assassination of Karzai's main peace envoy, Burhanuddin Rabbani, last month

Sunday, January 23, 2011

Retired General Stanley McChrystal writes on the reasons for National Service & "basic responsibilities of being an American"’


The days of a Service Draft ended during President Nixon's term in office mainly based on the opposition to the Vietnam War and the mood of the country being against the military....The "Love" generation were more into themselves than to helping the country that gave them the ability to be "free"....Of course, many of them turned out to be the most ungrateful group our country has raised as the Early Boomers are still all about themselves.....You read about how they are considered the "ME" generation and that is evident when you see the Political Leaders like POTUS, Pelosi, Biden, the Clintons, etc.....they are the epitome of the self-centered idjits that came out of this era....Talk about useless and ungrateful....They were "takers" and not givers.

That is why many of my era (Born at the tail-end of the Boomer era) and others born since then have gravitated towards Military Service as we wanted to "give back" to our country and strived to be the opposite of the ungrateful Boomers / Hippies....

I was in Afghanistan while Gen. McChrystal ran the show and I found his style to be what I expected from a Leader of his caliber - competitive, puts out a "take-no-prisoners" attitude and was willing to go the extra mile to show his dedication. He expected a lot of his men but also returned that same level of dedication back to them. He was a good leader and one that was respected until the crap was written about him by Rolling Stone...the writer who wrote the article betrayed the trust given him and I bet if you had a writer follow POTUS around all day and record every conversation he has, you would get a very similar result....POTUS & BIDEN likely say crap all day that would not make good press.

General McChrystal writes a good piece on why we should require & instill a sense of National Service as a way of making our country stronger....a good read and something we likely need now more than ever.



Step Up For Your Country
The general who led U.S. forces in Afghanistan makes the case for national service and the ‘basic responsibilities of being an American.’
by Stanley McChrystal - January 23, 2011


Standing recently in new haven’s small train station, I was approached by a stranger who thanked me for my service. His gratitude was clearly genuine—and I deeply appreciated it.

During my years in uniform (particularly after 9/11), and even in the months since my retirement, I was routinely thanked for serving. For service members today, that experience is common—a thoughtful gesture that has done much to maintain the morale of a force that performs so bravely for our nation.

Common—but thanking Americans for their service is not common enough. Nor can it be, because Americans performing critical, selfless service to our country are less common than they must be.

We have let the concept of service become dangerously narrow, often associated only with the military. This allows most Americans to avoid the sense of responsibility essential for us to care for our nation—and for each other. We expect and demand less of ourselves than we should.

And now it is time to fix it.

“Service member” should not apply only to those in uniform, but to us all.

The concept of national service is not new, nor is it outdated. When America needs it, national service is the personal obligation of every American. And she needs it now.

All of us bear an obligation to serve—an obligation that goes beyond paying taxes, voting, or adhering to the law. America is falling short in endeavors that occur far away from any battlefield: education, science, politics, the environment, and cultivating leadership, among others.

Without a sustained focus on these foundations of our society, America’s long-term security and prosperity are at risk.

We live in a nation of rights, and jealously defend them.

Thomas Jefferson drew upon the ideas of the Age of Enlightenment’s finest minds to articulate the concept of “inalienable rights” in defining the essential freedoms guaranteed to Americans in the new republic.

Those rights are sacred. We fought a war to make the Declaration’s statement of rights a reality, and have sacrificed since to defend them.

But as important as those inalienable rights are, there are also inalienable responsibilities that we must accept and fulfill. Those responsibilities are wider than are often perceived or accepted. Just as we have allowed the term “service member” to apply solely to the military, we have allowed the obligations of citizenship to narrow.

Even the most basic responsibilities of being an American are considered optional by many. In the seeming anonymity of modern life, the concept of community responsibility has weakened, yet is needed more than ever.

Responsibility is most easily accepted when the need is clear and expectations are defined by tradition.

I saw this up close in Afghanistan. In a harsh environment, agriculture long functioned and flourished through the use of ingenious irrigation systems, often employing extensive and complex underground tunnels called karez that moved water to where it was needed.

Because the systems were essential, yet required manpower-intensive upkeep, maintenance was clearly understood to be a responsibility of the community, performed as a shared task without pay.

The shared responsibility served to unify the community. The Soviet intervention in 1979 resulted in damage to the systems; subsequently, private individuals acquired wells and pumps, disrupting the community dynamic. What had been a unifying responsibility for all was now a source of wealth for a few—and yet another source of frustration for the rest.

discussions of national service typically stall in the transition from general concepts to specific recommendations—because that’s when it gets hard. It is here where we must clearly understand our real objective.

A veteran of AmeriCorps’ National Civilian Community Corps described his experience working and living for a year as part of a 10-person team doing projects:

“My teammates were conservative and liberal, black, white, Asian, Jewish, Christian, atheist .?.?. We had to get along or be miserable.”

Today, 10 years after completing the experience, he finds that his former teammates remain in touch and believes the experience was absolutely instrumental in helping them determine their career trajectories. They feel it helped them develop teamwork skills, confidence, problem-solving abilities, community building, leadership, and communication skills. His favorite response, from a liberal New England–born Jewish woman about a construction project in rural South Carolina: “If I can learn to use eight different types of saws and work with 10 reverends to build a house, what can’t I do?”

There has been a genuine effort with programs like AmeriCorps (and its expansion) and the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act to encourage, incentivize, and more effectively manage service to the nation. But despite their value, we have fallen short in mobilizing enough Americans to service.

We can always outsource work—hire other people to complete projects—arguably with greater efficiency. But we must understand that our real objective must be in shaping Americans. We must build into our society, and into ourselves, a sense of ability and responsibility.

We must recognize that service is typically doing things that you would not choose to do, but that must be done. It can be rewarding; it can also be difficult, onerous, and even dangerous. It cannot rely on short-term volunteers any more than our independence could be won by the people Tom Paine termed “summer soldiers and sunshine patriots.” It must have people with a firm commitment, backed by a society that values their contribution.

Service need not follow a single model—or feel like the military. It should be voluntary (but expected), fueled by clear incentives. It can be a combination of nongovernment and government programs ranging from public health to the Peace Corps.

At its heart, the real value of national service will be more in the effect service has on those who provide it than the work they provide. There must be some common denominators that form a foundation for the program. As a start, I offer three:

• Service must involve a firm commitment for a specified period of time: at least one year. With few exceptions, that commitment should imply full-time involvement.

• Participants must be paid. The underlying concept of service and sacrifice (and relative inexperience of most young people) should keep compensation modest and relatively equal across the programs.

• The primary incentives for service should be a combination of things like education benefits and hiring preferences (similar to military veterans’ programs).

Building acceptance of a responsibility to serve will require more than rhetoric, or even funded programs. It will demand a true cultural shift in how we view personal and community responsibility.

But it is a shift that Americans are ready for. They need only leadership and encouragement. As I saw in serving with the most elite military forces in our nation’s history, performance is ultimately driven by the expectations individuals set for themselves.

When the best is demanded of us, we rise to the occasion. When our systems adapt to recognize and honor such service, that process is reinforced and accelerated.

Soldiers who have fought for a road, hill, or village understand the value they place on otherwise meaningless foreign ground when they have invested in its protection.

Teachers who have worked tirelessly to motivate students understand the value and potential of young people who would otherwise pass them unnoticed on the street.

My friend Greg Mortenson, author of Three Cups of Tea and Stones Into Schools, has proved time again the power of ownership. By assisting Afghans and Pakistanis with materials and assistance in building schools, but demanding their direct commitment and responsibility, Mortenson has seen remarkable success. We shouldn’t be surprised—it is predictable. But it is also hard work.

At home, more than building schools, we need to build a sense of ownership in, and responsibility for, America.

Critics sometimes point to the costs associated with service programs and argue that national service is an inefficient disruption of capitalist markets, producing a Soviet-style mismatch of talent to task and undermotivated workers. They argue that for young people, the program would represent a time-wasting delay of entry into our society and economy.

But perhaps those critics have never read accounts of workers who built the Hoover Dam or Panama Canal, or listened to service members of Tom Brokaw’s “Greatest Generation” describe their feeling of contribution—and the effect it has had on their lives.

In an age that demands metrics of progress, how will we know when a culture of service has taken root? It won’t be measured in the prose of pundits or the claims of politicians.

We will know when new graduates of high schools and colleges talk with each other about how, not whether, they will serve America.

We will know when the ambitious recognize that credible service is a necessary entry on their résumés. And when a cocktail-party discussion of “how I served” produces eager efforts to impress.

For me, personally, I’ll know when a soldier stops a teacher in a train station and says, “Thank you for your service.”

McChrystal, a retired four-star general, is the former commander of U.S. and International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan and the former commander of Joint Special Operations Command.